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INTRODUCTION 
 Heights of Justice explores political, social, economic and procedural attributes of 
justice, as applied law.  Themes combine theory and practice to articulate moral and 
ethical values that facilitate a rational application of law.  This application seeks to foster 
legal arrangements imbued by values associated with the Jesuit tradition, including the 
dignity of persons, advancing the common good and compassion for the underprivileged.  
Actions in the name of justice exhibit commitment to serving others; legal scholarship in 
this vein is dedicated to providing intellectual and professional sustenance necessary to 
achieve these objectives.  
 For lawyers, pursuit of these objectives begins in law school. Legal education 
ideally entails dialogue and intellectual discovery. Dialogue includes making connections 
between seemingly different classifications, such as theory and practice, or clinical 
training and feminist jurisprudence.  Such iteration, along with parallel exchanges using 
interdisciplinary and comparative inquiry, often produces surprisingly powerful insights. 
One example is how seeming dichotomies sometimes turn out not only to be false, but to 
reflect a mutually-complementing spiral. Engaging discussion of this kind among 
teachers and students broadens pedagogical range, rendering law not merely a system of 
rules but a pathway to justice.  When such conversations continue into reflective legal 
practice, inventive conceptions of justice emerge that deepen the meaning and value of 
lawyering. 
 In justice’s political dimension, institutional legitimacy is a cornerstone.  An 
example is the relationship between governmental branches, especially between the 
judiciary and legislatures. Finding harmony in this relationship, whether through inquiry 
into the nature of equity or when addressing such charged topics as bioethics, lends a 
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sense of justice to these institutional dynamics. Similar inquiries illuminate the 
relationship between central and local authorities in a federal republic. One virtue of 
federalism is that it enables central authority to promote democratic legitimacy by 
policing or pressuring local authorities. Contemporary lawmaking is complex, 
incorporating executive branch agencies (such as the Food and Drug Administration and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission), private actors (such as the American Dental 
Association and the Financial Accounting Standards Board) and international 
organizations (such as the World Bank). Suitable institutional arrangements to ensure 
political justice are essential to incorporate such participants.  
 Institutional legitimacy depends, further still, on the content of resulting social 
and economic policies. This need creates an intersection of law and society requiring 
attention to principles of both democratic order and equality. At the center of this 
intersection are matters of wealth distribution, influenced by tax policy, and socio-
political factors such as family structures and trade unions. In an information age, how 
information is shared is central to organizational legitimacy, of both government and 
large enterprises such as public companies. Equality plays a complex role in this 
democratic process, influencing such important issues as immigration and deportation 
policy and health care delivery. Questions of equality must deal with the role of 
difference, apparent in such settings as treatment of girls versus boys in juvenile justice 
systems and in trans-racial adoptions (white parents adopting black babies). 
 Convention helps to promote institutional legitimacy and the values of democracy 
and equality. Convention’s virtue, however, depends upon its endless critique.  For 
example, accepted models of decision-making or international trade law must be tested, 
sometimes refashioned, and only then do they remain legitimate. Slavery, a convention, 
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withered only under critique. Associated methods of discourse promote justice. This 
occurs independent of the intellectual tradition used for study, such as pragmatism, 
liberalism, utilitarianism, or Aristotlean virtue ethics, to name a few major approaches.  
When applied to lawmakers, discourse pitting convention against critique advances 
justice too, whether assessing the drafting of commercial codes or writing judicial 
opinions resolving copyright disputes.   
 In adjudication, justice entails supervision, starting with the appeal and involving 
judicial review of official conduct, such as prosecutors in grand jury proceedings. Judges 
also must police themselves and their courtrooms; they frequently must reconcile legal 
mandates with moral values when these collide, or oversee expert witnesses when 
assessing probity of proffered evidence. Courts’ infirmities in adjudication invite 
pursuing alternative paths to justice, such as mediation.  Blazing such passages may 
require doctrinal adjustment, the pursuit of which promotes justice.  Bolder paths to 
justice include pre-dispute contracting, a recent innovation in international tax law.  This 
shows capacity of contemporary institutions to respond justly to needs of an endlessly 
changing world.   
 While justice may be a vague concept, it is powerful and pervasive. Its infinite 
complexity inclines scholars to recognized categories of justice. Roughly, leading 
examples are political justice, distributive justice, corrective justice, and procedural 
justice (fairness in administration). These rough categories are contested, overlapping, 
and often essentially tools of convenience. While these conceptions have some utility, 
practical justice would suffer from attempting to classify its manifestations into such 
pigeon holes.  Instead, Heights of Justice is organized to reflect the preceding 
illustrations.   
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 This arrangement generates considerable coherence in the topics featured.  This 
collection of scholarship is unusual because it is all generated by members of a single law 
faculty, Boston College Law School.  Each contributor pursues an individual scholarly 
arc.  Each develops an individualized body of knowledge that gels, when viewed in total.  
This volume captures a different coherence, one across colleagues of a school.  This 
unusual feature means both (1) the collection presents an organic whole, readable in the 
sequence presented and (2) it will enrich readers who prefer to skip around, and these 
readers likely will wish to study further works of particular scholars.  In preparing this 
introduction and in selecting excerpts for inclusion, I serve as a reader, interpreter and 
narrator of the works.  Commentary and content thus filter through a different lens than 
the original materials, making me, not each author, responsible for any omissions of 
nuance or subtlety. 
I. Legal Education and Practice 
 Contributions collected in the book’s opening section reflect upon the meaning of 
legal education, teaching, writing and thinking about justice. The first series of works 
addresses dialogue in legal education, the second builds on these foundations to explore 
roles in the legal academy, and the third extends these insights into the practice of law.  
 A. Dialogue. Conventional wisdom denominates law school’s principal task as 
teaching students to “think like lawyers.” Gregory Kalscheur demonstrates how 
restricting such a conception is and pushes, instead, for law schools to celebrate the 
fundamental human drive to ask questions and to follow our curiosity wherever it takes 
us. Professor Kalscheur elucidates the thought of Bernard Lonergan and James Boyd 
White to enhance understanding of meaning and value in conceiving law as a social and 
cultural activity. Envisioning law school as a process called “re-horizoning,” he 
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emphasizes how traditions of the Society of Jesus enable law schools within a Jesuit 
university, such as Boston College, to provide unique ways to establish cultures of 
authentic conversation. 
 In a classic work that Professor Kalscheur draws upon, Mark Spiegel first 
provides working definitions of theory and practice and then explains how division into 
these categories does not reflect a natural order but a choice.  By discussing development 
of the case method and the legal realist challenge to it, he shows how traditional 
approaches to legal education can be seen either as theoretical or as practical.  Professor 
Spiegel explains that these labels are thus contingent products of our age, explores why 
we persist in this labeling and what difference this makes for legal education and its 
capacity for enrichment.   
 Provisionally adopting Professor Spiegel’s working definitions of theory and 
practice so dissected, Phyllis Goldfarb deepens the theme using two movements in law’s 
academy: clinical education (seen as practical) and feminist jurisprudence (seen as 
theoretical). She identifies underlying methodological kinship to illustrate how 
problematic the theory-practice label remains. By studying the ethical impulse that sparks 
both clinical education and feminism, Professor Goldfarb discerns a theory-practice 
spiral, growing through mutual affinities.  This discovery opens a new ethical vision to 
reinvent the nature of moral theory as anchored in the concrete reality of specific people 
in our lives, not one orbiting around the abstract “generalized others” of traditional 
philosophy. 
 Dialogue in legal education is the animating theme of Hugh Ault’s ensuing essay, 
which explores comparative law as a directive force in reshaping legal education.  A 
world-renowned comparative tax scholar, Professor Ault recounts his pioneering 
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development of a comparative law course at Boston College Law School decades ago. 
The essay is contextualized in the broad framework of change in legal education during 
the last decades of the twentieth century.  That is when law professors became 
increasingly inventive, law became increasingly interdisciplinary, and critical theory 
from legal history, philosophy, economics and other fields enriched the tapestry of legal 
rules and their operation to generate deeper insights into legal systems. 
 B. Roles. The second series of pieces in this section builds upon these 
transformative enterprises to explore varying conceptions of roles in legal education. 
Noting the sociological foundations of the concept of role, Filippa Anzalone reflects on 
learning theory, showing how teachers are more effective when self-aware. The piece is a 
phenomenology of discovery about learning theory, a report of applied knowledge aimed 
at excellence in pedagogy and a study of how contemporary reflective practice and 
criticism continue to transform legal education and the professor’s role in it. 
 The contribution featuring Alexis Anderson explores challenges facing various 
participants in law school externship programs, centering on ethical issues of 
confidentiality.  The piece uses cases to illuminate the roles of students and supervisors in 
the field and on the faculty.  It provides protocols to teach students skills and professional 
habits necessary to provide competent client representation. 
 Jane Kent Gianfriddo, President of the Legal Writing Institute, presents a theory 
of written analytical feedback on student writing for law practice. She envisions legal 
writing teachers playing the dual role of legal educator plus reader in law practice.  
Professor Gianfriddo illustrates how her theory works, using a specific legal problem 
showing student communication and teacher feedback, along with commentary on why 
the feedback succeeds pedagogically.  
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 Judith Tracy extends Professor Gianfriddo’s framework to demonstrate how using 
samples in the classroom enhance analytical development.  Balancing the roles of legal 
educators engaging students to pursue justice while training them as professionals, she 
explores teaching methods producing imminent engagement.  These emphasize the 
specific roles of audience and writer, not monolithic off-the-rack exercises.  
 C. Lawyering. Legal education does not stop at law school, but demands 
continued nurturing. In the practice of law, a theme of roles continues.  But as Daniel 
Coquillette explains, it is impossible for lawyers in practice to separate professional 
ethics from personal morality. Yet these sometimes conflict.  Emphasizing how 
professional identity as lawyers is the center of the lawyer’s personal morality, Dean 
Coquillette’s  meditation focuses on our ultimate motivation for obeying rules in all roles. 
He critically examines three theories of professional behavior—goal-based, rights-based, 
and duty-based—to guide lawyers into justice’s humanistic roots, away from 
instrumentalism. 
 Recognizing the impossibility of drawing sharp lines between the lawyer and 
one’s self, Judith McMorrow considers latitude lawyers have in committing acts of civil 
disobedience. Such conduct may be proper under certain circumstances for non-lawyers, 
yet remain improper for lawyers.  Professor McMorrow develops a theory and prescribes 
a norm of special caution for lawyers.  Its premise is the correlation between the rule of 
law and positive law, meaning that lawyers bear special obligations to act in accordance 
with law to promote democratic legitimacy.  This limits lawyerly civil disobedience, 
guided by the standard of special caution. 
 The question of roles likewise contributes to defining the nature of lawyering.  
Paul Tremblay works through competing conceptions of poverty lawyering, dubbed 
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“rebellious” lawyering and “regnant” lawyering.  Regnant lawyering is the conventional 
approach, emphasizing client autonomy and calling for the lawyer to advance the client’s 
interests here and now.  Rebellious lawyering takes a broader and longer view, 
conceiving of the lawyer’s role as driving a “justice-based allocation of resources away 
from clients’ short-term needs in favor of a community’s long-term needs.”  Professor 
Tremblay develops a theory of justice aimed at refashioning legal ethics into this model 
of lawyering. 
 Building on themes of critical self-reflection, Carwina Weng examines 
scholarship on multicultural lawyering to discover a focus on learning about culturally-
different clients. The literature wrongly overlooks the human inclination towards 
unconscious cultural blindness and discrimination against those who are different.  To 
address this oversight, she calls for a new conception of multicultural lawyering, one 
demanding self-analysis of one’s culture and its influences. Professor Weng contributes a 
framework for learning cultural self-awareness, using cognitive and social psychology to 
lend completeness to cross-cultural lawyering. 
II. Institutions and Legitimacy 
 The delivery and administration of justice depends upon existence of legal 
institutions. In a democracy, these require components that provide balance and fairness 
to systemic efficacy and legitimacy. Traditional notions of separation of powers and 
federalism support these structures in the United States.  Increasingly administrative 
agencies and private actors, both within the United States and globally, play critical 
though inchoate roles. Scholars explore advanced attributes of these legal power 
structures in this section.   
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 A. Separation of Powers.  The relationship between the judicial and legislative 
branches of government in generating law and justice is a central theme of United States 
jurisprudence.  The first pair of contributions in this section considers aspects of this 
relationship.  Both reflect how it is the role of legislatures to express political will and of 
courts to mediate it. 
 Zygmunt Plater examines the role of equitable discretion in the modern statutory 
context. He starts with an unsettling proposition: courts, even courts in equity, lack 
discretion to permit violations of statutes to continue despite broad mandates to “balance 
the equities.” Resolving this separation of powers puzzle involves dissecting equitable 
powers into three distinct balancing exercises: a threshold balance, a balance on the 
question of contending conducts, and a balance in tailoring equitable remedies. Equity 
defers to legislation in the second but retains discretion as to the first and third.  So the 
thrice-balanced method facilitates equity in the age of statutes, mediating the roles of 
courts and legislatures.  
 Charles Baron explores, more directly, the relative desirability of law being made 
by courts or legislatures, using the law regarding the “right to die” to illustrate. Common 
law responded, in the absence of legislation, to technological advances in prolonging 
human life.  Legislators sidestepped difficult questions while case law incrementally 
evolved responsive legal principles. The interaction exhibits law’s magisterial dialectic 
process. Neither branch is institutionally subservient to the other.  The interaction 
between them promotes public confidence that results yield more just law.   
 B. Federalism. Public confidence is a component of democratic legitimacy; it is a 
critical function of federalism.  Likewise a central theme of United States jurisprudence, 
the second pair of contributions in this section considers aspects of the federal-state 
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relationship.  Both reflect federalism’s flexibility enabling it to promote public 
confidence and democratic legitimacy. 
 George Brown explores federal prosecutions of state and local officials for 
political corruption. These actions pose difficult issues of how federalism relates to state 
autonomy and local sovereignty. He examines Sabri v. United States, which endorses 
such actions without appreciating the significant constitutional issues they pose, and links 
it to the widely-publicized campaign finance reform case (McConnell). Questioning 
conventional rationales such as justifiable protection of federal funds, Professor Brown 
explains that endorsing these federal actions promotes anti-corruption imperatives 
grounded in principles making Congress “the guardian of the democratic process.”   
 Renee Jones explains federalism on similar grounds of public confidence in 
lawmaking. She focuses on federalism in corporate law, implicated by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 that suggests a “creeping federalization of corporate law.” She 
explains that a realistic federal threat to state jurisdiction is critical to development of 
legitimate corporate law among states. Professor Jones uses Sarbanes-Oxley to ground 
one prong of her theory of dynamic federalism.  This is a relationship between state and 
federal regulation that enables each to reinforce the other’s efficacy.  In this context, 
enabled by the federal preemptive threat, federal legislation induces state courts to 
jurisprudential shifts congruent with democratic principles garnering popular support.   
 C. Contemporary Lawmaking. The federal preemptive threat inherent in 
federalism, and the separation of powers concept, play defining roles in the broader stage 
of law production found in the administrative state.  Each piece in this part grapples with 
this complex, radial, production of law in contemporary society, including the role of 
private actors.  
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 Mary Ann Chirba-Martin examines public safety when private associations 
establish standards—endorsed by federal agencies—that may not be in the public interest.  
The illustration is dental amalgam fillings, which the American Dental Association 
(ADA) champions as safe while the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) essentially 
defers.  Judicial capacity to provide a forum to resolve contending interests is limited.  So 
only state legislatures can produce law necessary to assure appropriate safety and 
dissemination of information—and they are constrained by the threat of federal 
preemption in doing so. 
 Federal administrative agencies increasingly leverage their regulatory function by 
adopting private standards as public law.  This phenomenon, well illustrated by how the 
Securities and Exchange Commission adopts private accounting standards for public 
companies, poses issues of both public access to materials and legitimacy of the process. 
In my contribution to this volume, I offer an analytical framework to promote the 
legitimacy of this process and, for the federal government, nominate the Director of the 
Federal Register to implement its objectives. 
 In emerging areas of international practice in which law as yet plays little formal 
role, innovative and creative approaches are essential to establish legitimacy and promote 
justice. David Wirth explores the example of how private organizations from the United 
States and abroad, together with donor country governments, have reoriented both the 
procedures for developing and the content of third world development agendas financed 
by the World Bank. He fashions a partnership advocacy model to guide those efforts, 
with particular attention to assuring democratic accountability to the poor in developing 
countries who are the ostensible, but rarely the actual, beneficiaries of donor lending 
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operations. Professor Wirth then defines a principled role for American lawyers in such 
partnerships. 
III. Law and Society 
 Law must respond to the needs of societies it governs to achieve justice. Two 
series of papers in this section illustrate how.  The first, presented as democracy, seeks 
systemic solutions in contexts of taxation, mediating institutions, the workforce and 
public access to governmental information. The second series, denominated as equality, 
addresses specific instances that focus on immigrants, girls, patients and infants.   
 A. Democracy. Democracy and wealth are inextricably bound, each facilitating 
and simultaneously threatening the other.  James Repetti demonstrates how wealth 
concentration impairs economic growth, due to reduced opportunities, and frustrates 
democratic processes. Particularly when wealth concentration arises from inheritance, tax 
policy should be used to offset these adverse effects, with proceeds from such transfers 
allocated to fund education that nurtures human capital.   
 A sub-theme of tax policy aimed at nurturing human capital is the idea of the 
middle class, a classification embracing a more general middle. Thomas Kohler laments a 
systemic tendency to overlook this vast “middle,” comprised of families, religious 
congregations, service and fraternal groups, grassroots political clubs, and unions—all of 
which mediate relations between individuals and institutions. Mediating bodies—“little 
platoons” of society as Edmund Burke called them—inculcate habits central to self-rule 
at individual and social levels. This is why Tocqueville stressed associations as mediating 
groups with potential to act as “schools for democracy.”  
  Extending this concern about the overlooked middle, Kent Greenfield considers 
federal law concerning candor. It protects against fraud in capital markets by theorizing 
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that accurate information facilitates optimal capital allocation. A similar rationale, 
perhaps even stronger, justifies equivalent protection against fraud in labor markets, but 
neither federal nor state law provides it. Professor Greenfield explains why common law 
and state regulation are inadequate, requiring a federal statutory approach.   
 Information is central to capital and labor markets and increasingly to all citizens 
in a democracy. The venerable doctrine called the public’s right to know underscores this 
theme when addressing information held by government. Mary-Rose Papandrea 
demonstrates judicial reluctance to promote this right when the executive branch asserts 
secrecy on grounds of national security. Yet the public’s right to know, grounded both in 
the First Amendment and the Freedom of Information Act, is essential to political justice, 
particularly amid national crisis when government activities are directed at non-citizens.  
 B. Equality. Non-citizens are part of numerous groups often put in law’s shadows, 
denied access to justice even though equality demands it. In the case of non-citizens, a 
critical moment of justice arises in deportation proceedings.  Daniel Kanstroom explains 
how deportation is often an automatic consequence of criminal conviction, yet 
constitutional protections provided in criminal proceedings do not apply in deportation 
proceedings. To maintain constitutional legitimacy, Professor Kanstroom says, the 
Constitution’s criminal law protections should be incorporated into the deportation 
system.  One model for doing so appears in the juvenile justice system.  
 The juvenile justice system’s goal is individualized rehabilitative justice, yet 
juveniles sometimes likewise are denied justice through blindness to notions of equality 
of treatment.  Effects can be particularly pernicious for girls. Francine Sherman 
documents the disparities girls face in the juvenile justice system and explains legal 
remedies to provide redress. While differences between male and female offenders have 
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undermined equal rights challenges in the adult arena, differences among individuals are 
acknowledged in juvenile courts, and dispositions can be driven by those individual 
needs.  
 If equality means addressing gender-specific needs of girls in the juvenile justice 
system, broader conceptions of equality play an overlooked role in politically-driven 
proposals for a “patients’ bill of rights.” While assigning due process rights to patients of 
privately-funded health plans, Dean Hashimoto explains that the proposals never 
appreciated how Medicaid-managed care systems often do not provide equal treatment 
for the poor or other minorities.  Any patients’ bill of rights should safeguard such 
patients by extending protections to such managed care programs based on a principle of 
equality, Professor Hashimoto says.  
 Principles of equality are complex. From whose viewpoint should equality be 
assessed?  Ruth-Arlene Howe confronts such questions in one of her classic articles on 
the trans-racial adoption debate—chiefly the adoption by white couples of black children.  
Her thesis is that the increase in such adoptions reflects less an interest in the equality of 
all persons participating in the process than it does an elevation of the interests of white 
adults above the needs of black children. Professor Howe urges a shift from seduction by 
the rhetoric about trans-racial adoption to crystallizing culturally-sensitive approaches to 
meeting needs of black children in foster care. 
IV. Convention and Critique 
 Conventional wisdom is often long on convention and short on wisdom.  Papers 
in this section critique and expose such limitations.  In legal discourse, this facilitates 
evolving legal conventions towards more just formulations, whether the topic is decision-
making, international trade, slavery, relationships or lawmaking.   
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 A. Aspirations.  Pragmatism, a hearty philosophy for centuries, occasionally 
comes under rebuke for lacking rational principles to resolve difficult questions.  
Catharine Wells defends pragmatic analysis of legal decision-making. She presents two 
models of normative decision-making that purport to distinguish between types of 
decision-making but shows how these describe interdependent parts of any decision-
making process. Professor Wells concludes that pragmatic decision-making should be 
appreciated as elucidating contextual elements of all forms of deliberation, not as 
rejecting rationally structured decision-making procedures. 
 Confronting the concept and meaning of justice head-on is an ambitious project.  
Taking the leap, Frank Garcia explores various theories of justice in the tradition of 
liberalism, including communitarian, libertarian, and fairness-based accounts.  From this 
analysis, Professor Garcia articulates a Rawlsian framework of justice that he expands to 
evaluate contemporary international trade law. His compelling conclusion, contrary to 
convention, is that traditional liberal justifications of the international order justify asking 
wealthier states to adopt redistributive policies in international trade law. 
 Effects of injustice persist long after corrections are made.  This is among the 
major lessons in our legacy of slavery.  Deep wounds heal slowly, and wounds of the soul 
may never heal.  Anthony Farley critically reviews the realities of slavery to conclude 
that “the black is the apogee of the commodity,” a trait sustaining inherited injustices 
marked by the trauma of “white-over-black.” Despite energetic search for empowerment 
and reparations by community leaders, such as the Black Panthers, this morally bankrupt 
legacy makes a mockery of accepted aspirational notions, such as the rule of law, 
designed to win struggles against injustice.  Achieving justice is even more perplexing 
than many conventional theorists may think. 
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 B.  Affiliations.  Legal classifications are often pivotal in conceptions of justice 
and applications of law.  How should relationships be treated, according to arms’-length 
norms of the market place or the relational strictures of fiduciary obligation?  A trio of 
pieces provides perspective on the law and nature of affiliations. 
 Scott FitzGibbon consciously sets out to develop a theory of affiliations, 
specifying its architecture and articulating associated ethical obligations.  This exercise 
entails engaging with the distinction between contract and fiduciary law. Applying virtue 
ethics, this account refutes utilitarian theories that deny any difference between contract 
and fiduciary duty. Accounting for the ethics, psychology and anthropology of 
affiliations, Professor FitzGibbon provides a basis for sustaining attributes that 
distinguish the worlds of contract and trust.  
 Law has struggled for centuries to classify the nature of marriage, as rooted in 
status or in contract. By reviewing evolving legal doctrines and social dimensions of 
three features of modern matrimonial arrangements—ante-nuptials, cohabitations, and 
property settlements—Sanford Katz concludes that marriage is a special model of 
contract, partaking of components of consensual free exchange along with social 
constraints directed through state agents. The result is a law of marriage in flux, blending 
private and public law, individual and communal values, local and national concerns.  
 The complexion of marriage as straddling the zones of private individual 
autonomy and public policy becomes more acute in amorous consensual relationships 
between teachers and students.  Elisabeth Keller explores the jurisprudential terrain 
anchored in freedoms of association and privacy but constrained by societal norms. 
 C. Lawmakers.  Justice is a performance as well as a structural process, meaning 
lawmakers are central figures.  They write laws, both in legislation and judicial opinions.  
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Studying these actors in action are two pairs of pieces, one on statutory commercial law 
and the other on judge-made copyright law. Bismark reportedly quipped that those who 
like laws (or sausages) should not witness how they are made; those who like justice 
insist upon seeing. 
 The Uniform Commercial Code is among the most ambitious and successful 
modern legislative initiatives, covering a broad range of commercial transactions in its 
dozen different articles.  Among the most famous of these statutes is Article 2, on sales, 
brainchild of Karl Llewellyn, a prolific and provocative law professor in his day.  A 
peculiar feature of Llewellyn’s work in Article 2 is a distinction between merchants and 
non-merchants.  Ingrid Hillinger demonstrates, contrary to common belief, that the 
merchant rules did not codify trade customs but codified Llewellyn’s conceptions of 
rational commercial rules.  Reconceived as statements of policy not reality, they invite 
asking how law shapes practice and why the merchant rules should not apply to non-
merchants. 
 Ontological issues appear in legislative drafting exercises of all kinds, including 
statutory updates of the UCC in light of technological change.  James Rogers cites 
changes in securities trading during the latter twentieth century, when electronic means of 
recording proliferated. Commercial law reformers rewrote the law in putatively media-
neutral terms, updating the law suitable for paper transactions to expressly cover 
paperless transactions. Professor Rogers explores the limits of this strategy, speculating 
that changes in the medium ineluctably change the content, meaning a shift from print to 
digits bears ontological effects obscured by such legislative updating. 
 Two copyright law scholars examine judicial approaches to the subject.  The 
judge’s job is to assess and, despite objective principles, this is an art.  The reality of the 
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judicial art is most pronounced when most reliant upon judgment, which is the field of 
copyright law that entails making aesthetic judgments.  Alfred Yen develops this 
exquisite insight by exploring major movements from aesthetic theory and showing how 
they correspond to the analytic premises of judicial opinions in copyright disputes.  
Accordingly, the aesthetic nature of legal reasoning requires explicit consciousness of 
aesthetics in judging. 
 Judges in copyright disputes often face arguments that the venerable fair use 
doctrine permits a copycat to use a work without payment or constraint.  The multi-factor 
judicial inquiry leaves out, surprisingly, the length of time since a work’s first 
publication. Joseph Liu examines this omission, showing how time is as important a 
factor in fair use analysis as traditional factors. Incorporating time facilitates dynamic 
judicial accounting for policy stakes, such as authorial incentives and public access, while 
also injecting public-regarding values into copyright jurisprudence. 
V. Courts and Beyond 
 Adjudication is the high-water mark of justice.  Assuring its integrity is central.  
Mechanisms include the appeal and other structural arrangements designed to promote 
integrity; judicial inspection reinforces these structures.  Enduring limitations of 
adjudication yield to searches for superior pathways to justice.  
 A. Supervision.  Inherent in the American system of justice is the possibility of 
appeal, a quintessentially supervisory conception enabling superior courts to review 
lower court judgments. Mary Sarah Bilder uses cultural history to explain that appeals are 
a foundational feature of American jurisprudence.  They are not merely legal procedures, 
rooted in common law, as convention has it, but a transatlantic characteristic of Western 
European legal culture. Professor Bilder defines an American “culture of appeal” as a 
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central attribute of justice rooted in legal, religious, political, and literary ideas dating to 
the 1630s.   
 If the appeal is an emblem of equitable justice, then appellate review of official 
actors is critical to justice. As Robert Bloom explains, the concept of judicial integrity is 
a hallmark of our Constitutional order, and sanctions judicial exercise of supervisory 
powers that, in turn, promote the integrity of persons acting under official license. He 
laments, however, that a series of Supreme Court pronouncements mistakenly retreats 
from the doctrine of judicial integrity, diminished in part by reduced exercise of such 
supervisory powers.   
 Specific judicial supervision is essential to police practices of prosecutors 
exercising executive branch powers. A common example occurs when prosecutors 
seeking a grand jury indictment possess but do not disclose exculpatory evidence during 
the proceeding.  Michael Cassidy demonstrates how historical appreciation of the grand 
jury’s role, combined with the supervisory powers of federal courts, mandates judicial 
review. Short of this, state legislative and judicial action can supervise prosecutorial 
discretion in grand jury proceedings by mandating disclosure of exculpatory evidence in 
specified cases. 
 B. Examination. Structures contribute partial promotion of justice in adjudication; 
courts also must exercise examination, of legislators, themselves, and participants in 
litigation. 
 Courts exercise considerable discretion when imposing sentences on criminal 
defendants, although various legislative schemes often exert limitations on this discretion. 
Difficult issues arise as to what due process safeguards are relevant to sentencing, as 
distinguished from substantive elements of a crime. Frank Herrmann explores the 
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landscape, encouraging applying full due process safeguards to all types of sentencing 
schemes. Critical in such exercises is how judicial supervision of sentencing laws can be 
achieved without provoking legislative efforts to negate this power through artful drafting 
of criminal statutes. 
 A slight but lethal swing in the penal pendulum occurring towards the end of the 
twentieth century brought death as a penalty back to the forefront of social thought.  This 
penalty poses profound moral issues for Catholic judges sitting in capital cases.  John 
Garvey provides a framework to reconcile legal requirements with religious conviction 
by inquiring into theories of cooperation in morally impermissible behavior.  His model 
establishes that Catholic judges cannot enforce the death penalty, either by sentence or 
upon jury recommendation, but face more difficult balancing when reviewing lower court 
orders or petitions for habeas corpus.  
 Adjudication requires establishing evidentiary grounds for conclusions, whether 
by judges or juries. Among difficult contexts is evidence provided by expert witnesses, 
designed to educate fact finders in arcane areas. Social scientific evidence poses greatest 
complexities. Mark Brodin measures this form of proof against specific reliability 
standards and general requirements for admitting expert testimony.  He finds that much 
of this testimony should be excluded.  It does not assist juries, can distort the accuracy of 
the fact-finding process and imperil a proceeding’s fairness. 
 C. Circumvention.  Judicial dispute resolution may be recognizable as a common 
means of adjudication, but alternatives proliferate. Obstructing these pathways are 
doctrinal entanglements or administrative obstacles, which two scholars in concluding 
pieces show can be removed. 
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 Ray Madoff reflects upon mediation’s appeal, observing its varying success in 
fields ranging from divorce (where it has worked well) to wills (where it has not).  She 
theorizes mediation’s relative success in divorce law is due to doctrinal revolutions such 
as the no-fault principle and its relative failure in wills settings as owing to the unseen 
hand of doctrine, a wills law that encourages opting for judicial disputation. To increase 
successful mediation for wills dispute resolution, doctrinal changes are necessary.  
 Innovations for dispute resolution increasingly take one step back in the process 
to prevent disputes from arising.  This occurs in international tax law when parties agree 
with governments in advance on the tax treatment of complex cross-border transactions.  
Diane Ring puts this fascinating “advance pricing agreement” procedure under the lens of 
administrative theory, to test the theory, including examining its lessons for academic 
accounts of the administrative state. She finds in this inquiry a certain justice in this 
innovation enabled by the administrative state, an exercise in cooperation that epitomizes 
emerging models of collaborative governance.  
Coda 
 Justice is law’s deep bed, whether the topography is called distributive, corrective, 
political or procedural justice, or located on the more textured terrain of social, economic, 
or racial justice. Normative moral theories and behavioral practices interact with law in 
complex ways.  Ethical lawyers grapple with value and meaning in all aspects of their 
spiritual, intellectual, moral, and professional lives, whether in formal legal education or 
practicing law.  Contributions to this anthology animate how these theories and practices 
ascend to the heights of justice. 
      Lawrence A. Cunningham 
      Associate Dean for Academic Affairs 
      Boston College Law School 
      December 2005 
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